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Authoritarianism, Socioethnic Diversity, and Political Participation across Countries 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We argue that threatening stimuli affect political participation levels among non-authoritarians 
more than among authoritarians. We focus on socioethnic diversity, which is known to be 
particularly threatening to authoritarians and to relate negatively to political participation in the 
general public. Analyses of individual- and macro-level data from 53 countries support our 
thesis. Participation levels among authoritarians are largely static, UHJDUGOHVVRIDFRXQWU\¶VOHYHO
of socioethnic heterogeneity, while non-authoritarians participate considerably less in countries 
with relatively high levels of socioethnic heterogeneity. This suggests that authoritarians 
participate to a proportionately greater degree in the most diverse countries.  
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Authoritarians exhibit intolerant and punitive attitudes when they perceive a threat to the social 
cohesion of the ingroup (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; Feldman 2013; Feldman and Stenner 
1997; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005; Stenner 
2009a). However, less LV NQRZQ DERXW DXWKRULWDULDQV¶ EHKDYLRUDO SURILOHV DQG WKHUHIRUH WKH
impact they may have on society. There is theoretical and empirical grounding for the claim that 
authoritarians participate less in political affairs, or have less interest in participating, than the 
average individual (cf. Duncan et al. 1997; Heath et al. 1994; Janowitz and Marvick 1953; 
Lalljee et al. 2013; Milbrath and Klein 1962; Peterson et al. 2002; Peterson et al. 1997). 
However, there is reason to question whether authoritarians are under all conditions less 
participatory than non-authoritarians. 
From an attitudinal standpoint, authoritarians and non-authoritarians respond differently 
to specific threats. Stenner (2005), for example, finds that authoritarians become more intolerant 
and punitive when exposed to threats to the values and institutions that characterize their 
ingroup, while non-authoritarians tend to become more tolerant and understanding. Hetherington 
and Suhay (2011), alternatively, find that authoritarians do not become more hawkish or less 
supportive of civil liberties in response to terroristic threat. Non-authoritarians, however, do 
display such attitudinal shifts. Hetherington and Suhay argue that, as ³authoritarians live in a 
stressful state of hyper-vigilance,´ and therefore already hold extreme attitudes before being 
exposed to further threat, there is little room for them to become more hawkish or less supportive 
of civil liberties (548). 
Attitudes and behavior do not necessarily respond to stimuli in similar ways (Ajzen 2005; 
Banaji and Heiphetz 2010; Fishbein and Ajzen 2011), and so the attitudinal patterns identified by 
Feldman and Stenner (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005), Hetherington 
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and colleagues (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009), and others may 
not translate to the behavioral realm. In this paper, we focus primarily on socioethnic diversity, 
placing theoretical emphasis on the normative and existential threats that accompany it. Based on 
insights from the political psychology and political participation literatures, we argue that, due to 
existential threat in particular, participation levels between authoritarians and non-authoritarians 
converge in response to socioethnic diversity.  
We test our expectations with multilevel models that allow us to simultaneously examine 
individual-level data from the World Values Survey and country-level data from a variety of 
sources across 53 democracies. As suggested by previous research, we find that authoritarians 
are generally less likely to participate in the political process. Further, and consistent with our 
expectations, we find that there is a negative relationship between socioethnic diversity and 
political participation, but only among non-authoritarians. Our results are robust to a variety of 
measurement strategies.  
This paper provides evidence that the participation gap between non-authoritarians and 
authoritarians disappears in the most socioethnically diverse societies. Given the more intolerant 
and punitive policy preferences of authoritarians, closing the gap in participation between 
authoritarians and non-DXWKRULWDULDQV LV OLNHO\ WR FKDQJH D FRXQWU\¶V SROLWLFDO FOLPDWH DQG may 
have considerable consequences. We consider this in the conclusion. 
 
AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
$QLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLNHOLKRRGRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVRIWHQWDNHQWREHDIXQFWLRQRIWKHFRVWVRI
participation relative to the expected benefits (e.g. Downs 1957; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983; 
Riker and Ordeshook 1968). In the same manner in which limited extrinsic resources, such as 
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income or transportation, restrict participation (e.g. Rosenstone 1982), so do limited internal 
resources such as low levels of political or civic knowledge. Recent research additionally 
connects emotions and personality traits to political participation (e.g. Best and Krueger 2011; 
Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gerber et al. 2011; Marcus 2000; Mutz 2002; Neuman 2007; 
Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino et al. 2009).   
Authoritarianism, ³DQ LQGLYLGXDO SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH DSSURSULDWH EDODQFH
between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and 
GLYHUVLW\ RQ WKH RWKHU´ (Stenner 2005, 14), is also connected to political participation. 
Specifically, authoritarians tend to be less participatory than average (e.g. Duncan et al. 1997; 
Heath et al. 1994; Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Lalljee et al. 2013; Milbrath and Klein 1962; 
Peterson et al. 2002; Peterson et al. 1997). Theory and evidence suggest two reasons for this. 
First, authoritarians tend to be more anxious than others (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Oesterreich 
2005; Onraet et al. 2013; Wolfradt et al. 2003), and anxiety is connected to lower levels of 
political participation (Best and Krueger 2011; Mutz 2002; Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino et al. 
2009). Second, authoritarians, on average, have fewer cognitive resources²including political 
knowledge²than non-authoritarians (Altemeyer 1996; Heaven et al. 2011; Lavine et al. 2005; 
Lavine et al. 2002; Stenner 2005). The intrinsic costs for authoritarians to participate in the 
political sphere are therefore greater than average.  
Attitudinally, threat to the values and institutions that characterize the ingroup conditions 
the relationship between authoritarianism and intolerant and punitive attitudes (Stenner 2005), 
and the relationship between authoritarianism and political participation may also be conditioned 
by threat. There are three lines of thought regarding how it might do so. The first suggests 
authoritarians will become more participatory when exposed to threat (e.g. Duncan et al. 1997; 
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Peterson et al. 1997) in much the same way that they become more intolerant and punitive when 
exposed to such. The second argues that, as with people in general (e.g. Best and Krueger 2011; 
Mutz 2002; Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino et al. 2009), authoritarians will become less 
participatory when confronted with threat-based anxiety (e.g. Blair et al. 2003). The third, 
suggests that, as authoritarians feel threatened and anxious much of the time (Hetherington and 
Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009), their participation levels will remain static as their 
level of perceived threat is unlikely to change. Below we consider threats produced by 
socioethnic diversity, in particular, and their potential effects on participation among 
authoritarians and non-authoritarians.   
 
SOCIOETHNIC DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG 
AUTHORITARIANS AND NON-AUTHORITARIANS 
 
As noted by Costa and Kahn (2003, 104), ³,Q PRUH-diverse communities, people participate 
OHVV´ ,QGHHG Hxtant work demonstrates that socioethnic diversity has a robustly negative 
relationship with political participation, and, in this literature, threat is commonly used as a 
mechanism connecting decreased participation to diversity (cf. Alesina and Ferrara 2000; 
Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Coffé 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Putnam 2007; 
Reeskens and Wright 2013). We argue that diversity has heterogeneous effects on participation 
across authoritarians and non-authoritarians. 
To structure our argument, we separate threat into two forms: normative and existential. 
Normative threat is an expectation of harm to the perceived norms, values and institutions that 
characterize RQH¶V ingroup. Existential threat LV DQ H[SHFWDWLRQ RI KDUP WR RQH¶V physical and 
material wellbeing. Socioethnic diversity is often viewed through one of these lenses. Ethnic 
competition theory (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005; Schneider 2008; Zolberg and Woon 1999), for 
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example, argues that outgroups may pose a normative threat by introducing competition over 
customs, values, and identity. Realistic group conflict theory (e.g. Sherif 1966; Sherif et al. 
1961), alternatively, argues that outgroups may pose an existential threat by introducing 
competition over limited material resources such as jobs, housing, and welfare benefits. 
Socioethnic diversity can act as a normative threat, an existential threat, or both. 
We argue that, in regard to political participation, the behavioral profiles of authoritarians 
and non-authoritarians diverge in response to the existential threat produced by socioethnic 
diversity. For non-authoritarians, existential threat associated with outgroup presence will induce 
heightened anxiety over material resources, and this anxiety will lead to a drop in participation 
among such individuals (Best and Krueger 2011; Mutz 2002; Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino et 
al. 2009) 7KDW LV H[LVWHQWLDO WKUHDW IURP ³RWKHUV´ ZLOO LQGXFH DXWKRULWDULDQ-like, low-levels of 
political participation among non-authoritarians. Conversely, socioethnic diversity is not a 
normative threat to non-authoritarians, who are less likely than authoritarians to hold 
ethnocentric or prejudicial attitudes (Duckitt and Farre 1994; Stenner 2005). As such, normative 
threat plays no role in the relationship between socioethnic diversity and political participation 
among non-authoritarians.  
For authoritarians, there is often an implicit expectation that they will become more 
participatory in response to normative threat. Mobilization theory predicts that individuals 
become politically active to remedy situations they are displeased with (Schlozman and Verba 
1979). As particularly ethnocentric and prejudiced individuals, it thus appears commonsensical 
that authoritarians will be particularly motivated to participate under conditions of socioethnic 
fragmentation in order to try and produce a more ethnically homogenous society. However, this 
does not account for the above-noted role of anxiety in participation and previous evidence that 
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authoritarians tend to withdraw from situations they perceive as threatening (e.g. Berzonsky 
1992; Duriez and Soenens 2006). 
We expect that participation among authoritarians will, on the whole, be unaffected by 
the existential and normative threat that accompanies socioethnic diversity. Authoritarians are 
hypersensitive to threat (Adorno et al. 1950; Oesterreich 2005; Onraet et al. 2013; Wolfradt et al. 
2003) and perceive it under conditions in which non-authoritarians do not (Hetherington and 
Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Socioethnic diversity is therefore unlikely to 
increase perceived normative or existential threat among authoritarians, as their hackles are 
already raised; essentially, socioethnic diversity will not alarm authoritarians because they are 
already alarmed. Persistent anxiety among authoritarians reduces political participation (cf. 
Valentino et al. 2011), resulting in their previously noted lower-than-average level of 
participation (Duncan et al. 1997; Heath et al. 1994; Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Lalljee et al. 
2013; Milbrath and Klein 1962; Peterson et al. 2002; Peterson et al. 1997). This is unlikely to 
drop further in response to socioethnic diversity.  
  
SYNTHESIS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on previous literature, we expect that authoritarianism and socioethnic heterogeneity will 
relate negatively to political participation. And, based on our own reasoning, we expect that the 
negative relationship between socioethnic heterogeneity and participation will be most 
pronounced among non-authoritarians because (a) diversity will decrease participation among 
non-authoritarians via existential threat, and, (b) as authoritarians live in a state of hyper-
vigilance, feeling persistently threatened by the inclusiveness and compromise inherent to the 
democratic political process, there is unlikely to be any additional normative or existential threat 
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brought about by socioethnic diversity that would have a supplementary depressive effect on 
their participation. This dynamic will lead to a convergence in participation levels across 
authoritarians and non-authoritarians in the most socioethnically diverse countries. This leads to 
three observable implications, expressed in hypothesis form as follows: 
H1: Authoritarians participate less in political affairs than non-authoritarians. 
H2: Political participation is lower in countries with more socioethnic diversity. 
H3: The negative relationship between socioethnic diversity and political participation is 
stronger among non-authoritarians than among authoritarians.  
 
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT 
To test our hypotheses, we utilize cross-national survey data from Waves 3-5 of the World 
Values Survey1 (WVS) and various sources of macro-level data, which are detailed below. We 
do not include Waves 1 and 2 of the WVS, as the questions necessary to create our age, 
education, and income control variables were not asked in nearly all Wave 1 surveys and the 
necessary education question was not asked across nearly all Wave 2 surveys.  
Our theses pertain to countries where individuals are free to participate in both the 
electoral and non-electoral arenas. As such, we include all democracies (as classified by 
Freedom House2) in the WVS sample for which data are available across our dependent and 
independent variables. Our sample includes 88 surveys in 53 countries conducted between 1995 
                                                     
1
 All sampling procedures, response rates, and question wordings are available at 
worldvaluessurvey.org.  
2
 freedomhouse.org 
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and 2008. There are a total of 109,743 individuals for which data on each variable are available, 
with an average of 1247 individuals per survey, a low of 332, and a high of 2986.  
 
The measurement of socioethnic diversity 
To measure socioethnic diversity, we first use the ethnic fractionalization index developed by 
Alesina et al. (2003), which accounts for the number of socioethnic groups and the relative size 
of each group within a country.3 The range of the index in our data is 0.02 to 7.52, with higher 
values indicating more diversity.  
 Stoll (2008) shows that conclusions drawn from statistical analyses are sometimes 
dependent on the measure of diversity employed. To guard against this, we also employ the 
fractionalization index developed by Fearon (2003), who, independently from Alesina et al. 
(2003), produces DOLVWRIVRFLRHWKQLFJURXSVFRPSULVLQJDW OHDVWRIDFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQ
Fearon applies the same formula as Alesina et al. to create his fractionalization measure. The 
range of the index is 0.04 to 8.80 in our data, with higher values again indicating more diversity.  
 We also utilize a measure of socioethnic diversity from the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR) dataset, created by Cederman, Min, and Wimmer (see, for example, Wimmer et al. 2009). 
This measure only accounts for groups considered to be politically relevant²if one or more 
significant actors claim to represent the group in national politics or if members of the group are 
systematically and intentionally discriminated against politically. The range of the index is 0.00 
                                                     
31 - s
i
2
å
, where s is the proportion of the population consisting of group i in a given country. 
We multiply the index by ten to give it a theoretical range of 0 to 10.  
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to 9.02 in our data,4 again with higher values indicating more diversity. The three measures of 
diversity are strongly interrelated; each bivariate correlation is above r = 0.8.5  
 Arguably, changes in socioethnic diversity will more strongly induce threat than existing 
socioethnic divisions. For authoritarians, there is some evidence that they adapt to familiar 
³EDFNJURXQG´GLYHUVLW\(Dunn and Singh 2014) and, being averse to breakdowns in the stability 
of the status quo, are threatened most acutely when the existing level of diversity increases 
(Stenner 2005).6 There is also evidence that changes in diversity are more threatening than 
diversity itself to the general public. For example, attitudes toward immigrants are known to be 
more sensitive to changes in socioethnic diversity than existing levels of diversity (e.g. Coenders 
and Scheepers 2008; Hopkins 2010; Newman and Velez 2014). While the variation necessary to 
calculate changes in diversity is not present in the Alesina et al. (2003), Fearon (2003), or EPR 
datasets,7 we are able to create change-based measures across many of the WVS countries using 
                                                     
4
 We multiply the original index by ten, which gives it a theoretical range of 0 to 10. 
5
 The bivariate correlation between the Alesina et al. (2003) measure and the Fearon (2003) 
measure is r = 0.90, the bivariate correlation between the Alesina et al. (2003) measure and EPR 
measure is r = 0.81, and the bivariate correlation between the Fearon (2003) measure and the 
EPR measure is r = 0.88. A principal component analysis indicated that 91 percent of the total 
variance in the three measures is attributable to a common dimension.  
6
 For example, Irish immigrants in the United States may have, at one time, been a threat to 
³QDWLYH´ DXWKRULWDULDQV &XUUHQWO\ RQH ZRXOG EH KDUG SUHVVHG WR ILQG DQ\ HYLGHQFH RI WKLV
association. 
7
 The EPR measure does have some intertemporal variation, but it is slight and the measure is 
often constant within countries for decades at a time.  
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data on immigration inflows. We discuss the immigration-based measures and the results of 
models that employ them in more detail in the Online Appendix.  
 
The measurement of authoritarianism 
As we outline in the Online Appendix, authoritarianism is difficult to reliably gauge, which 
compels us to be particularly careful in regard to its measurement. We follow Feldman and 
Stenner (1997), who propose a strategy for measuring authoritarianism using questions that 
LQTXLUHDERXWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFKLOGUHDULQJYDOXHV)HOGPDQDQG6WHQQHUDUJXHWKDWWKHVHTXHVWLRQV
PHDVXUH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ WR H[SUHVV intolerant and punitive attitudes under 
conditions of threat, without actually invoking such attitudes. 
For studies of authoritarian attitudes, the unobtrusive measurement of VXEMHFWV¶
authoritarian predisposition is important so as to avoid tautological findings. While we depart 
from previous studies of authoritarianism by focusing on behavioral, rather than attitudinal, 
outcomes, we also employ this unobtrusive measure of authoritarianism. We believe such a 
conservative approach helps to ensure that any processes that simultaneously affect authoritarian 
attitudes and political behavior do not confound our findings.  
7KHDXWKRULWDULDQSUHGLVSRVLWLRQVFDOHFDSWXUHVDXWKRULWDULDQV¶SUHGLOHFWLRQs to obedience 
DQGFRQIRUPLW\,WLVFRPSRVHGRIIRXULWHPVJDXJLQJWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VYLHZ of desirable qualities 
to instill in children: independence, imagination, respect and tolerance for others, and obedience. 
7KH ILUVW WKUHH WUDLWV DUH FDWHJRUL]HG DV ³QRQ-DXWKRULWDULDQ´ ZKLOH REHGLHQFH FRUUHVSRQGV ZLWK
authoritarianism. While many survey instruments require respondents to choose between 
competing child-rearing values, on the WVS questionnaire, individuals can select the above four 
traits from a list of ten items presented to them. Each trait is scored as a 0 if it is considered 
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desirable to the respondent and scored 1 if not, except for obedience, which is reverse coded. 
These items are summed to create the authoritarian predisposition variable. This variable ranges 
from 0 to 4, with 4 being the most authoritarian. In a series of empirical tests, Feldman and 
Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005) demonstrate that child rearing questions used to create the 
scale are valid indicators of authoritarianism and fairly reflect the construct. This scale, or a 
similar variant, is used in a number of existing studies of authoritarianism (e.g. Brandt and Henry 
2012; Cizmar et al. 2014; Dunn forthcoming; Dunn and Singh 2011; Dunn and Singh 2014; 
Federico et al. 2011; Federico and Tagar 2014; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009; Roccato et al. 2014; Singh and Dunn 2013; Solt 2012; Stenner 2005; Stenner 
2009a; Stenner 2009b).  
  
The measurement of political participation 
Our dependent variable, Political Participation, is a scale derived from four items. First, each 
respondent was asked if he or she had participated in: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, or 
attending peaceful demonstrations. Each variable is coded 1 for respondents who reported 
participating in the activity and 0 if not. Second, respondents were asked whether they belonged 
to a political party. This question was also coded dichotomously, with 1 indicating the individual 
is an active party member and 0 indicating the individual is not a member or is an inactive 
member. (This is not a question about a psychological partisan attachment, but instead gauges 
formal affiliation with a political party.) These four variables are combined into a summated 
rating scale yielding a reliability coefficient of 0.55, which we rescale to range from 0 to 10. 
Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides the mean value of the political participation scale 
across our 88 country-years. 
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A conspicuous omission from this scale is an indicator of participation in elections. This 
is excluded because the first four waves of the WVS did not ask respondents whether they turned 
out to vote. However, a turnout question is asked in Wave 5, along with further questions about 
non-electoral political participation, and we have thus created a second scale composed of 
questions available only in Wave 5. The use of this scale does not alter our substantive results, as 
we demonstrate in the Online Appendix.  
 
Control variables  
At the individual level, we control for Age, Education, gender (Male), Income, and Political 
Interest, each of which is linked to political participation in previous research (Almond and 
Verba 1963; Blais 2006) $JH LV D PHDVXUH RI WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V UHSRUWHG DJH in years. As the 
positive relationship between age and the propensity to participate reverses at a certain point 
(Brians and Grofman 2001; Rosenstone 1982), we include the square of age to account for this 
pattern. The Education variable is coded from 1 to 6, respectively indicating: no or incomplete 
primary (elementary) education, complete primary education, incomplete secondary school 
(technical or university-preparatory), complete secondary school (technical or university-
preparatory), university education without degree, and university education with degree. Gender 
is a dichotomous measure, with males coded 1 and females coded 0. The Income variable ranges 
from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the lowest reported income within a country and 10 the highest. 
Finally, Political Interest is a standardized composite measure of two items from the WVS: 
³LQGLFDWHKRZLPSRUWDQW>SROLWLFV@LVLQ\RXUOLIH´DQG³KRZLQWHUHVWHGZRXOG\RXVD\\RXDUHLQ
SROLWLFV"´ The reliability coefficient for this scale is 0.73, and higher values indicate more 
interest. It is particularly important to control for political interest, as it is theoretically linked to 
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both political participation (e.g. Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Pardos-Prado et al. 2014) and 
authoritarianism (e.g. Duncan et al. 1997; Heath et al. 1994; Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Lalljee 
et al. 2013; Milbrath and Klein 1962; Peterson et al. 2002; Peterson et al. 1997), meaning 
excluding it from our models would likely introduce bias into our findings.  
 At the survey level we control for Economic Inequality, which has a theoretical link to 
both socioethnic diversity and political participation (cf. Baldwin and Huber 2010; Costa and 
Kahn 2003; Schattschneider 1960). We capture economic inequality with the Gini Index, in 
which higher values indicate more inequality. Data are from the :RUOG %DQN¶V World 
Development Indicators (WDI).8 Summary statistics for each variable included in our analyses 
are provided in the Online Appendix. 
We also estimated our models with a series of survey-level controls for economic 
development, growth, and security. We gauged economic development with GDP per capita in 
constant 2005 international dollars, we used GDP growth to capture economic growth, and we 
used the unemployment rate and inflation (change in consumer prices) to capture economic 
security. Data were obtained from the WDI. While substantive results are the same with the 
inclusion of these control variables, we opt to exclude them from our primary analyses to 
minimize the number of macro-level covariates included in our multilevel setup. Further, 
individual-level income, which is included in our models, likely captures many of the theoretical 
mechanisms linking participation to economic well being and security. 
 
                                                     
8
 Available at: data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Where the Gini 
Index for a particular WVS country-year was unavailable, we used the measure for the most 
proximate preceding year in which the measure was available. 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In our sample, individuals are grouped within various national surveys. It is likely that 
individual-level errors are correlated within each survey, as there are many factors unique to a 
particular country in a particular year, to which respondents will be exposed to as a group. Not 
accounting for this grouping effect would be tantamount to assuming, for example, that each 
individual in a particular survey had his or her own level of socioethnic diversity. This could lead 
to false inflation of the significance levels of the macro-level coefficients, as well as improperly 
assuming constant error variance across country-years. As such, we estimate a multilevel model, 
taking individuals (level 1) to be clustered within survey country-years (level 2). This approach 
corrects these problems and allows for the estimation of unique effects within each country-year. 
A multilevel model is also well suited to our theses, which dictate relationships between 
variables measured at both the individual and country-year levels.  
 We also estimated three-level models that consider individuals to be clustered within 
country-years and country-years within countries. With few years per country, this approach is 
potentially inadvisable (cf. Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Gelman and Hill 2007, 275-276; 
Stegmueller 2013), and, because substantive results are identical with the three-level approach, 
we proceed with the simpler two-level models here. Further, as the political participation scales 
count the number of political activities, we also used negative binomial link functions to map 
from the covariates to the dependent variables. As substantive results are not sensitive to this 
approach, we continue with a simpler linear framework.  
 Our setup is captured as follows:  
yij Įj + xijȕ İij, 
 ZKHUHĮj = ȖjȌ ȗj. 
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Individual i¶s participation in country-year j is denoted as yij. The individual-level covariates are 
contained in xij and the country-year-level covariates are contained in Ȗj. The vector ȕ contains 
the coefficients associated with xij, and the vector Ȍcontains the coefficients associated with Ȗj. 
7KHLQWHUFHSWVDUHFDSWXUHGZLWKĮj, and vary by country-\HDUDQGWKHȗj term captures variation 
around these intercepts. Any interaction between an individual- and country-year-level covariate 
effectively becomes an individual-level covariate, and is thus included in xij. The random error 
IRUHDFK LQGLYLGXDO LV UHSUHVHQWHGZLWK WKHİij term. The estimation of this equation provides a 
measure of ȡ  YDUȗ>YDUȗYDUİ@RUWKHSURSRUWLRQRIXQPRGHOHGLQGLYLGXDOSDUWLFipation 
due to unobserved country-year effects. 
In Table 1 we display the results of the estimation of six models. The individual-level 
control variables behave as expected across our models. All else being equal, participation is 
initially positively related to age, but at roughly 50 years old this positive relationship reverses. 
Participation is also positively related to education, income, and political interest, and men tend 
to participate more than women. At the country-level, economic inequality has no relationship 
with participation, with the other covariates taken into account. Across the models, ȡ hovers 
around 0.10, which indicates that roughly ten percent of the variation in individual-level political 
participation is due to unobserved factors present in a particular country-year.  
 Turning to the tests of our hypotheses, Models 1-3 estimate the additive relationships 
between political participation and authoritarianism and socioethnic diversity. Model 1 employs 
the Alesina et al. (2003) measure of socioethnic diversity, Model 2 employs the Fearon (2003) 
measure, and Model 3 employs the EPR measure. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The 
negative and significant coefficient on authoritarianism in all three models indicates that 
participation is lower among authoritarians than non-authoritarians, as expected. This provides 
 16 
support for our first hypothesis. The substantive effect of authoritarianism on participation is 
within the range of the effects of more established, individual-level correlates of participation. 
Per Model 1, a standard deviation increase in authoritarianism corresponds to a -0.16-unit 
decrease along the participation scale, or 1.6% of its range. This can be compared with the 
effects of a standard deviation increase in education, income, and political interest, which 
correspond with an increase of 3.3%, 0.7%, and 5.4% of the range of the participation scale, 
respectively.  
 We find mixed support for our second hypothesis, that socioethnic diversity is negatively 
related to political participation. While the coefficient on diversity is negative across the first 
three models, as expected, it is not statistically different from zero in Models 2 and 3 (the two-
sided p-values on the coefficient are .270 and .156 in Models 2 and 3, respectively). This is 
surprising, given the well-established negative association between socioethnic fractionalization 
and participation (cf. Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Coffé 2009; 
Costa and Kahn 2003; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Putnam 2007; Reeskens and Wright 2013). 
However, rather than indicating that the negative relationship between diversity and participation 
is absent or uncertain, these weak relationships may indicate that it is only present among a 
particular subgroup of the population, non-authoritarians, as we put forth in our third hypothesis.  
 To test our third hypothesis, we turn to Models 4-6 of Table 1, in which we interact 
authoritarianism with the socioethnic diversity measures. If our expectations hold, the coefficient 
on the socioethnic diversity measures will be negative and statistically significant, which will 
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indicate that participation is less likely among non-authoritarians where diversity is higher.9 In 
addition, the coefficient on the interaction terms should be positive and significant, indicating 
that the negative relationship between diversity and participation is weaker among more 
authoritarian individuals.  
[Table 1 and Figure 1 About Here] 
This pattern is precisely what is observed in Model 4, which uses the Alesina et al. (2003) 
measure of socioethnic diversity, in Model 5, which employs the Fearon (2003) measure, and in 
Model 6, which employs the EPR measure. In each model the coefficient on diversity is negative 
and large in magnitude relative to its standard error, while the coefficient on the interaction 
between diversity and authoritarianism is positive and much larger in magnitude than its standard 
error. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of socioethnic diversity on predicted political participation 
among authoritarians and non-authoritarians (those who score the minimum and maximum on 
the authoritarianism measure, respectively). The top panel is created with the results of Model 4, 
the middle panel is created with the results of Model 5, and the bottom panel is created with the 
results of Model 6. For those high in authoritarianism, there is essentially no relationship 
between socioethnic diversity and political participation. Conversely, there is a strong and 
negative relationship between diversity and participation among those low in authoritarianism. 
As a result, in countries with very high levels of socioethnic diversity, predicted levels of 
                                                     
9
 The coefficient on a constitutive variable of an interaction term indicates the effect of that 
variable on the dependent variable when the other constitutive variable equals zero. In this case, 
zero is the minimum value of the authoritarianism scale.  
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participation among those highest and lowest in authoritarianism are not statistically different. 
We thus find strong support for our third hypothesis. 
In sum, the results demonstrate that authoritarians are less likely than others to participate 
in general, and socioethnic diversity neither further suppresses nor increases authoritarian 
participation. Instead, the negative relationship between socioethnic diversity and participation is 
only realized among non-authoritarians. As such, participation levels among authoritarians and 
non-authoritarians converge in very diverse countries. 
 
A test of the existential threat mechanism 
Existential threat is key to our proposed theoretical process; in particular, we argue that diversity 
will decrease participation among non-authoritarians via existential threat, while, among their 
authoritarian counterparts, additional existential threat brought about by socioethnic diversity is 
unlikely to further suppress participation. This suggests that the negative relationship between 
socioethnic diversity and political participation observed among non-authoritarians depicted in 
Figure 1 should be strongest for those who are likely to feel existentially threatened by 
socioethnic diversity.  
We can test this by accounting for economic securityZKLFKFDSWXUHVRQH¶VOLNHOLKRRGRI
feeling diversity-induced existential threat; specifically, those who are least economically secure 
should be most likely to perceive threat to their material well-being in high diversity settings. We 
measure economic security using an additive index of RQH¶V LQFRPH EUDFNHW DQG employment 
status.10 To examine whether the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and participation 
                                                     
10
 Income is measured as described above, and unemployment is coded 0 for those actively 
seeking work and 1 for those who are not. While these variables are weakly related (linear 
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is conditional on both authoritarianism and economic security, we re-estimate Models 4-6, 
including a three-way interaction among authoritarianism, fractionalization, and economic 
security in each model.  
Because three-way interactive models are difficult to interpret with numerical output, we 
graphically depict the results in Figure 2. We provide the numerical results in Table A3 of the 
Online Appendix. Attesting to the veracity of our hypothesized existential threat mechanism, 
Figure 2 figure demonstrates that the negative relationship between diversity and predicted 
participation (depicted by the darkest line) is steepest among non-authoritarians with low levels 
of economic security. Indeed, the estimated slope of the line for non-authoritarians with low 
levels of economic security is significantly different from that of their authoritarian counterparts 
at p < .05, two-sided, across all three models. Further, for authoritarians, participation is 
statistically unrelated WRGLYHUVLW\UHJDUGOHVVRIRQH¶VOHYHORIHFRQRPLFVHFXULW\ 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The electoral success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) has recently trended upward in 
many European countries (see, for example, Mudde 2007). With increased immigration into and 
among European countries, it seems intuitive that this increased success is due to an authoritarian 
                                                                                                                                                                           
correlation: -0.11; polychoric correlation; -0.19; reliability coefficient of scale: 0.05), we feel that 
the income and unemployment status taken together better capture economic security than either 
measure on its own. Results are substantively the same when income and unemployment are 
entered into the equations individually, though this requires the estimation of a four-way 
interaction. Results are also substantively the same when we include education in the scale.  
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backlash toward socioethnic diversity. Indeed, Dunn and Singh (2011) refer to PRRPs DV ³WKH
LQVWLWXWLRQDOHTXLYDOHQWRIDXWKRULWDULDQLQGLYLGXDOV´DQGWhere is often an implicit assumption in 
the authoritarianism literature that threat causes authoritarians to become more politically active 
and to rally toward populist parties, especially those on the political right (e.g., Adorno et al. 
1950; Altemeyer 1996; Arendt 1973; Fromm 1969; Lipset 1959; Stenner 2005). By explicitly 
examining political participation among authoritarians and non-authoritarians, this paper shows 
that at least the initial part of this assumption is incorrect. 
Specifically, our analyses demonstrate distinct participatory responses to ethnic diversity 
among authoritarians and non-authoritarians. For non-authoritarians, socioethnic diversity relates 
negatively to political participation, as is often demonstrated in extant research. The positive 
relationship often assumed in the authoritarianism literature, however, is not evident; on the 
whole, authoritarian participation levels do not significantly vary with socioethnic diversity. This 
finding may seem surprising in light of previous literature that suggests increasing diversity will 
boost intolerance and threat levels among authoritarians (e.g. Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; 
Feldman 2013; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005; Stenner 2009a), who may, in turn, 
become spurred to participate in order to push for a more homogenous society. However, given 
that authoritarians maintain rather static and high levels of threat and anxiety (Adorno et al. 
1950; Oesterreich 2005; Onraet et al. 2013; Wolfradt et al. 2003), we argue and demonstrate that 
participation among such individuals should actually be lower than average and relatively 
immobile. 
Our findings further suggest that the rise of populist, far right parties is not a result of 
heightened authoritarian participation, but may instead result from converging participation 
levels among non-authoritarians and authoritarians. When non-authoritarians participate less and 
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authoritarians continue to participate at the same rate, the politically active portion of the 
population, on balance, becomes more authoritarian. Given the more intolerant and punitive 
policy preferences of authoritarians, this closing gap in participation levels may have a 
considerable impact on election results and, in turn, the policy preferences of elected 
representatives.  
Still, it is not clear that PRRP successes at the ballot box lead to significant changes in 
policy (e.g. Mudde 2013). Further, Dunn (forthcoming) finds that authoritarian participation is 
not uniformly beneficial to PRRPs; in certain countries, authoritarians are more likely to support 
traditional party families. Future research would do well to further examine the relationship 
between authoritarianism, diversity-based threat, and political choices (e.g., which party one 
votes for or which social movements one joins), rather than political participation, on which we 
focus here. 
 Finally, we recognize that there are plausible alternative theoretical accounts for the 
patterns we uncover. For example, Putnam (1993; 2000) suggests that ethnic diversity decreases 
social capital and the political participation that accompanies it. Such a breakdown can also 
explain decreased participation among non-authoritarians in heterogeneous societies. And, 
DVVXPLQJWKDWDXWKRULWDULDQV¶DOUHDG\-low participation profiles are less sensitive to the level of 
social capital, this argument is also consistent with the closing gap in participation levels 
between authoritarians and non-authoritarians that we observe. Additional work is needed to 
gauge the validity of our theoretical explanation vis-à-vis other, plausible accounts of the 
relationships we uncover.  
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Note: Plots created from Models 4-6 of Table 1. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 1: Socioethnic Diversity and Predicted Political Participation among Authoritarians 
and Non-Authoritarians 
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Note: Plots created from Models A1-A3 of Table A3 in the Online Appendix. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2: Socioethnic Diversity and Predicted Political Participation among Authoritarians 
and Non-Authoritarians, Accounting for Economic Security   
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Table 1: Authoritarianism, Socioethnic Diversity, and Political Participation 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models estimated with multilevel linear regression.  
 
 
 
Alesina et 
al. 
Diversity 
Fearon  
Diversity 
EPR 
Diversity 
Alesina et 
al. 
Diversity 
Fearon  
Diversity 
EPR 
Diversity 
Covariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Individual-Level       
Authoritarianism -0.155 -0.155 -0.155 -0.260 -0.245 -0.216 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Male 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.148 0.148 0.147 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.050 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age2 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Education 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.220 0.220 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Income 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.003 0.003 0.003 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political Interest 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.637 0.638 0.638 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Country-Level 
      
Socioethnic Diversity -0.094 -0.040 -0.043 -0.142 -0.078 -0.073 (0.037) (0.036) (0.030) (0.037) (0.037) (0.030) 
Economic Inequality -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
      
Interaction 
      
Auth. ¯ Socioethnic Diversity    0.027 0.020 0.016 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
       
Constant -1.215 -1.228 -1.195 -1.046 -1.080 -1.099 (0.294) (0.296) (0.295) (0.296) (0.298) (0.295) 
   
 
   
Model Statistics 
R2 0.151 0.148 0.148 0.153 0.149 0.149 
ȡ 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103 
Prob. > Ȥ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Observations 109743 109743 109743 109743 109743 109743 
Number of Country-Years 88 88 88 88 88 88 
       
